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COURT OF APPEALS, 1956 TERM
an obvious indication that section 36-b should not receive any special jurisdictional
distinction from the rest of the Lien Law.
The dissent argued that section 36-b did not confer any lien rights whatso-
ever; that the gravamen of plaintiffs action is the funds diverted, not the real
property; that this was a right in personam to impress a trust upon the funds
diverted, and thus should not be restricted by the in rem lien concept adhering
to real property.
To the assumption of the majority that "real property" in the Lien Law must
be restricted to New York because of no contrary expressed intention of the
Legislature, the dissent pointed out that a similar argument had been rejected in
Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co.2 In that case the Court determined that
section 233 of the Real Property Law (providing that moneys, deposited as
security for performance of realty contracts, are to constitute trust funds in the
hands .of depositee) was applicable to a deposit made in New York, even though
the lease affected real property located in Virginia. "The Legislature did not
expressly limit the statute to deposits made under a contract for the use or rental
of real property situated in New York, and we do not think it should be thus
limited by judicial construction."
The dissent further pointed out that now New York materialmen and
laborers could be defrauded with impunity, whenever the realty to be improved
was outside the state, since the foreign state would also lack jurisdiction to
impress a trust upon the funds diverted in New York. In Ridgefield Supply Co. v.
Rosen,4 a similar situation to the instant case, the Court was of the same
opinion.
The reasoning of the majority appears unduly mechanical. It is difficult
to conceive that the Legislature intended to protect and benefit only those
materialmen and laborers who contribute to the improvement of domestic realty.5
Since the Mallory case and the instant case have come to different results, there
exists minimal stability in this area. An official word from the Legislature
indicating the jurisdictional limits of statutes in this field, would go far in
obviating confusion and probable future litigation.
Priorify Of Liens
As between a judgment credtor's lien and the equitable lien of an assignee
of property subsequently to be a.quired, the latter, while his rights will be
2. 300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d 468 (1949).
3. Id. at 302, 90 N.E.2d at 471.
4. 1 Misc.2d 675, 679, 147 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
5. See ANNUAL Ri:i'0RT Or " 'm.ii LAW REVISION CoiISSION, 1942, p. 283.
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enforced in equity as against his assignor,' has no right at all against the former.,
This rule applied by the lower courts7 in reference to liquor license refunds has
caused some confusion, first, as to whether this is the correct rule to be applied
in such cases, and secondly, when, in terms of priority, the fund comes into
existence.
In City of New York v. Bedford Bar and Grill, Ivc.,8 the appellant received
as security for a note from Bedford an assignment of all monies due or to become
due from the State Liquor Authority. Upon default on the note, appellant filed
its assignment with the liquor authority and soon thereafter Bedford surrendered
his license, rendering him eligible for a refund. Subsequent to these events the City
of New York obtained a creditor's lien on the refund through supplementary
proceedings resulting from a warrant for taxes due. Finally, the Authority
approved the refund and the issue arose as to who had priority over the debt.
The Court9 held in favor of the City, adopting the rule stated above as applied
by the courts in the Third Department.10
Recently the Court of Appeals, in Capital Distributor's Corp. v. 2131 Eighth
Ave.," held that an assignee of a possible refund upon the denial of a license
application took priority over subsequent judgment creditor's liens, a result
which the majority distinguished, terming that assignment "a present interest for
a present consideration"' 2 as opposed to a "yet to be created fund""n in the
instant case. However it seems clear, as the dissent points out, that at the point
of time of the surrender of the license for refund, the obligation of the liquor
authority to the assignee is less speculative than the possibility of the denial of
the license application and the resulting return of the money.
It has been held, in the case of an equitable assignee, that if the fund came
into existence prior to the filing of the tax lien, the assignee takes priority.'4
And in a contest between judgment creditors, the Court has held that a judgment
lien is effective upon surrender of the license, but before approval by the liquor
6. Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York. 207 N.Y. 203, 100 N.E. 806 (1912);
Zartman v. First National Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907).
7. Alchar Realty Corp. v. Meredith Restaurant, 256 App. Div. 853, 8 N.Y.S.2d
733 (3rd Dep't 1939); Palmer v. Remaine, 259 App. Div. 951, 20 N.Y.S.2d 145
(3rd Dep't 1940); Atlas Advertising Agency v. Casa Cubana, 259 App. Dlv. 951,
19 N.Y.S.2d 900 (3rd Dep't 1940); Frank v. Lutton, 267 App. Div. 703, 48 N.Y.S.2d
137 (3rd Dep't 1944).
8. 3 N. Y.2d 429, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1957).
9. Ibid.
.10. See note 7 supra.
11. 1 N.Y.2d 842, 153 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1956).
12. 3 N.Y.2d at 431, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
13. Ibid.
14. In re Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946). On motion for reargu-
ment, the issue of priority was settled. In re Gruner's Estate, 4 Misc.2d 471, 74
N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
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authority, over a lien filed after approval, explicitly stating that the comptroller
held an attachable debt at the date of the surrender of the license.15
In the instant case, the dissent questioned the applicability of the rule in re-
gard to after-acquired chattels, stated above, since the fund necessarily arises out
of a present property right, and the policy of that rule, the possibility of fraud
on creditors is not applicable here. The general rule where the fund is to arise
out of an existing relationship between the assignor and the potential source of
the fund, is that such an assignment is valid against creditors of the assignor who
acquire liens after the fund comes into existence.',
Nevertheless, a liquor license refund in New York is now deemed to come
into existence at two different times; by authority of Strand v. Piser,T at the
surrender of a judgment creditor, and, according to the instant case, on the ap-
proval of the refund in the case of an assignee acquiring his right before sur-
render of the license.
Damages On Lapse Of Mechanics' Liens
The grantee of a certain piece of real property orally promised to pay the
contractor for improvements made while the grantor was in possession. When
the contractor brought a suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien against the grantor and
the grantee for these improvements he allowed the lien to lapse by failing to
file a notice of pendency within one year from the date of the filing of the lien.18
In its consideration of this factual situation, the Court of Appeals' 9 in a
unanimous opinion, held that even though the lien had lapsed20 and even though
the complaint alleged a contract to make specific improvements2 ' the plaintiff
could recover a personal judgment against the grantor-lienee,- 2 but he could re-
cover nothing against the grantee.2 3 Upon deciding these issues, the Court faced
the central problem raised by this case: What constitutes an appropriate award
under these circumstances? The Court decided that the personal judgment that
15. Strand v. Piser, 291 N.Y. 236, 52 N.E. 2d 111 (1943).
16. Niles v. Mathusa, 162 N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 184 (1900); Bates v. Salt Springs
Nat'l Bank, 157 N.Y. 322, 51 N.E. 1033 (1898); Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N.Y.
320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1889).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. N.Y. LIEN LAW §17; Danziger v. Simonson, 116 N.Y. 329, 22 N.E. 570
(1S89).
39. Noce v. Kaufman, 2 N.Y.2d 347, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 1 (1957).
20. See note 18 sutpra.
21. As long as the defendants are not misled, the New York rule is that
the variance between pleading and proof will not be considered. Sussdorff v.
Schmidt, 53 N.Y. 319 (1873).
22. N.Y. LIEN LAW §.§17, 54.
23. Under the Statute of Frauds an oral promise lo assume the debt of
another is unenforceable. N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §31(2).
